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Abstract  
While there is an agreement that the Fordist accumulation regime has come to an end in the 
course of the 1970s, there is no agreement on how to characterize the post-Fordist regime (or 
if a such is already in place). The paper seeks put together various arguments related to 
financialization (in the broad sense) from a macroeconomic point of view and investigate the 
relevance of these arguments by means of an analysis stylized facts for EU countries. The 
paper discusses changes in investment behaviour, consumption behaviour and government 
expenditures, investigating to what extent changes are related to financialization. Households 
experience higher debt levels. Rising profits of businesses come with only moderate 
investment. The notion of a “finance-dominated” accumulation regime is proposed to 
highlight that financial developments crucially shape the pattern and the pace of 
accumulation. The finance dominated accumulation regime is characterized by a mediocre 
growth performance and by higher volatility. However, so far deregulated financial markets 
have not lead to major financial crises in advanced capitalist economies. A possible reason for 
this is that the size of the state sector has not been substantially reduced despite neoliberal 
attempts to do so.  
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 Introduction 
 
The notion of financialization covers a wide range of phenomena: the deregulation of the 
financial sector and the proliferation of new financial instruments, the liberalization of 
international capital flows and increasing instability on exchange rate markets, a shift to 
market-based financial systems, the emergence of institutional investors as major player on 
financial markets and the boom (and bust) on asset markets, shareholder value orientation and 
changes in corporate governance (of non-financial business), increased access to credit by 
previously ‘underbanked’ groups or changes in the level of (real) interest rates. 
Financialization has also been used to highlight changes psychological and ideological 
structures. The list could easily be extended. This paper aims at exploring what (some of) 
these changes mean for macroeconomics.  
 
To do so, the macroeconomic structure will be explored by means of the standard Keynesian 
demand function. Aggregate demand consists of private consumption (C), investment (I), net 
exports (NX) and the budget deficit (BD) of the public sector: Y = C + I + NX + BD.1 Each 
of these components will be investigated to analyze whether changes due to financialization 
have occurred and modified the relevant behavioural pattern. This means that different aspects 
of financialization will be investigated in the explanation of different macroeconomic 
variables. This inconsistency is, however, not a shortcoming of this paper, but a reflection of 
the state of research on financialization where no unified concept or explanation of 
financialization has emerged.  
 
Beyond and next to investigating the effects of financialization on isolated key 
macroeconomic components, the paper aims at exploring whether these effects give rise to a 
coherent pattern. In other words, we ask whether we can meaningfully speak of a finance-
dominated accumulation regime and, if so, what its macroeconomic characteristics are. The 
                                                 
1 One can also look at these relations in terms of savings behaviour of the various sectors of the economy. The 
savings of households (SHH), of corporations (SC), of government (SG) and of the foreign sector (SF) has to add 
up to zero: SHH + SC + SG + SF = 0. In other words, for each debtor there has to be a creditor. Not all sectors can 
run a deficit at the same time. Inversely, not all sectors can decrease their deficits simultaneously. Note that 
government savings is the negative of the budget deficits (i.e. the budget surplus) and that the savings of the 
foreign sector, that is capital inflows, is equal to the negative of net exports. This latter relation will become 
important in the final section of this paper. 
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argument is presented in a regulationist framework2 to highlight that the macroeconomic 
dynamic (described as the “accumulation regime”) is embedded in a particular institutional 
setting (the “mode of regulation”). While there is a universal agreement that the Fordist 
accumulation regime has come to an end in the course of the 1970s, there is no agreement on 
how to characterize the post-Fordist regime (or if a such is already in place). After an initial 
emphasis on flexibility and, later information and communication technology as driving 
forces of the accumulation regime, financial factors have recently received more attention. 
The notion of a “finance-dominated” accumulation regime is proposed to highlight that 
financial developments crucially shape the pattern and the pace of accumulation.  
 
This paper was prepared for the inaugural meeting of the International Working Group on 
Financialization. It has the task of offering a macroeconomic perspective on financialization. 
As the IWGF is an interdisciplinary group, the paper aims at summarizing recent research in 
macroeconomics and macroeconomic trends while being accessible (and relevant) to non-
economists.  
 
The term finance-dominated rather than finance-led is used to highlight that financialization is 
shaping the pattern of accumulation (or put in another way: the composition of the 
components of aggregate demand and their volatility). Boyer (2000), in a seminal paper, uses 
the term finance-led, a term that is related but different. Thus a clarification is necessary. An 
accumulation regime is defined as finance-led if an increase in the financial norm, that is the 
hurdle rate set by financial markets for investment projects, leads to an increase in growth. No 
presumption of this sort is made here. Rather it is argued that a finance-dominated 
accumulation regime should be defined in such a way that financialization can positively or 
negatively affect growth. The term finance-dominated is used to delineate our approach from 
that of Boyer (2000), which has its own merits and an admirable analytical clarity, but also 
can also obscure important effects of financialization: In particular, it is possible that the 
macro economy is not finance-led while still being shaped by changes in the financial sector. 
This is exactly the hypothesis put forward here. 
 
                                                 
2 Classical works of the (French) Regulation Theory include Aglietta (1979), Lipietz (1985) and Boyer (1990). 
Similarities between the Regulation Theory and the (American) Social Structures of Accumulation approach 
(Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982, Bowles, Gordon, Weisskopf 1983) are now widely recognized (e.g. 
McDonough and Nardone 2006).  
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For convenience our hypotheses regarding the key characteristics of the finance-dominated 
accumulation regime are summarized at the outset, before going into further detail. The 
argument put forward is that in the finance-dominated accumulation regime: 
• Consumption expenditures can at times become the driving force for growth as 
households gain improved access to credit. However this creates new potential for 
instability as servicing high debt levels may become difficult in recessions. 
• Investment expenditures are sluggish due to shareholder value orientation, increased 
uncertainty, and the strong (standard) accelerator effects in the investment function. 
Increased profits do not translate into higher investment. 
• Deregulation of financial markets lead to an increase of capital flows and, as a 
consequence, volatile exchange rates, which lead to an increase in uncertainty and 
repeatedly to severe currency crises. 
• The government share in GDP remains stagnant but high (despite to the neoliberal 
agenda to reduce it), which contributes to the stability of the economy. 
• Overall the finance-dominated accumulation regime thus comes with a moderate 
growth in aggregate demand … 
• … and exhibits a high degree of instability which typically emanates from 
international (foreign exchange) or domestic financial markets. 
 
The paper differs from the previous economic literature on financialization it two ways. First, 
it uses a broad notion of financialization that includes various changes in the financial sector. 
Most of the economic literature (Boyer 2000, Stockhammer 2004, 2005/06, Hein and van 
Treeck 2007, Skott and Ryoo 2007) uses a more specific, narrower and therefore analytically 
more convenient notion. For this paper we consider a rich set of changes in the financial 
sphere that have substantial effects on macroeconomic aggregates or macroeconomic 
behavioural functions. Rather than developing a full macroeconomic model or econometric 
tests, the paper seeks to distil empirically grounded stylized facts. 
 
Second, this paper has a focus on developments in Western European countries. Most of the 
empirical literature (Duménil and Lévy 2001, Crotty 2003, Krippner 2005) has a focus on the 
USA. This because financialization is presumably most developed in the USA and because 
data availability is, for many questions, better. However, financialization may have different 
effects on different economies. This is for two reasons. First, the USA (and the UK) are 
international financial centers and it is not obvious that the financial centers and the financial 
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periphery will be affected in parallel ways. Second, financialization is not only the result of 
exogenous developments (say in technology), but it is the outcome of policies. As political 
developments differ in different regions, European developments have to be analyzed in their 
own right. In particular, financial deregulation in European countries as well as monetary 
policy are strongly shaped by the particular (neoliberal) path of European integration (Bieler 
2003). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the background by discussing the 
neoliberal mode of regulation. Section three gives an overview over key macroeconomic 
indicators of the Euro-area. Sections four, five and six discuss potential changes in 
consumption behaviour, investment behaviour and capital flows due to financialization. 
Section seven looks at changes in government expenditures and section eight concludes by 
summarizing the findings and wondering why financial crises have not been worse so far. 
 
The background: a neoliberal mode of regulation 
 
Financialization is not the only important change in the macroeconomy and it is not a change 
that hit economies as an exogenous shock. Rather it is the outcome of particular policy 
arrangements. In this section we briefly will contextualise our analysis of financialization in 
the broader political economy setting. For this it is helpful to think of the socio-economic 
basis of the regime of accumulation in terms of a neoliberal mode of regulation. Space 
limitations prevent an extensive discussion of neoliberalism. It will thus have to suffice to 
highlight some key points of the neoliberal mode of regulation3
• A shift in power from labor to capital, expressed in falling wage shares in Europe and 
increased job insecurity. Depending on the country and region this articulated in an 
erosion of the organizational strength of labor, of increase power of capital, in part due 
to a more effective threats associated with capital mobility due to globalization. 
• A redefinition of the role of the state which involved privatization and deregulation in 
many areas. These deregulation range from product market deregulation, 
flexibilizations of the labor market to deregulation of financial market. This latter 
point of course being of particular importance here. 
                                                 
3 One might also call the present accumulation regime a “neoliberal accumulation regime”. At this stage the term 
finance dominated is used to highlight how changes in the financial system affect the components of demand. 
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• A redefinition of the monetary policy, which (at least in theory) used to support fiscal 
policy in its pursuit of full employment during the Fordist regime. In the neoliberal 
regime price stability has become the predominant and, in the form of inflation 
targeting, often the only policy goal of monetary policy. 
 
It is important to realize that neoliberalism does not just mean deregulation, but a selective 
form of deregulation. In many areas a re-regulation is taking place. This is most obvious in 
the case of the European Monetary System, that has been regulated and design in various 
forms over the past three decades.  
 
Neoliberalism is the outcome of political decisions. In continental Europe many of these 
decisions were decreed at the European level.4 The Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the Services Directive, to name but the most important ones, have been crucial 
vehicles to push forward the neoliberal agenda. However, this is not say, that the EU is a 
homogenous agent in pursuit of neoliberal goals. Rather it has its own internal conflicts and 
contradictions. Van Apeldoorn (1999) has coined the term ‘embedded neoliberalism’ to 
describe the predominantly neoliberal orientation of the EU policies that at the same time 
includes social aspects (thus the adjective embedded).   
 
The overall macroeconomic performance 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the development of key macroeconomic indicators for the 
Euro area (EU12) since 1970. As we lack an exact date for the end of Fordism and the 
beginning of the neoliberal mode of regulation, decades are used for periodization, which 
gives 10-year averages (except for the 2000s where the latest available data is used). These 
periods are long enough to iron out most of the fluctuations associated with the business 
cycle. The 1970s are the final decade of the Fordist era (or if one prefers the period of the 
crisis of Fordism). Neoliberalism was inaugurated by the Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, 
Helmut Kohl coming to power and coincides with an abrupt shift in monetary policy in the 
late 1970s/early 1980s. In the European context this periodization is convenient because the 
first neoliberal decade (the 1980s) includes the European Monetary and Exchange Rate 
System (EMS). The second neoliberal decade (the “1990s”) begins with the implementation 
                                                 
4 There seems to be a recognition that Regulation Theory has had focus on self-sustained national modes of 
regulation of the Fordist era. For the Post-Fordist regime supra-national actors and structures do play a more 
important role (Dannreuther and Petit 2006) 
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of the Single Market and is characterized in terms of economic policy by the Maastricht 
Treaty and the following Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The final period (the “2000s”) is 
shorter and therefore may reflect the cyclical downturn in this period. Any periodization is 
arbitrary in detail, however changes in periodization should make little difference for the 
overall picture. 
 
Table 1  
Macroeconomic performance, Euro 12   
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
real GDP growth 3.27% 2.43% 2.14% 1.49% 
Inflation (GDP deflator) 9.21% 6.13% 2.41% 2.01% 
real long term interest rate 1.40 4.04 4.66 2.45 
unemployment rate 4.16 8.55 9.61 8.47 
real wage growth 3.23% 0.62% 1.19% 0.45% 
Source: AMECO, except for inflation: OECD  
 
GDP growth is declining throughout this sample. Inflation had been reduced in the 1980s 
(from the high levels in the 1970s) and came down further in the 1990s. Real (short-term) 
interest rates were moderate in the 1970s, hiked in the 1980s. In the course of the 1990s they 
came down again (most importantly in the Mediterranean countries), but even in the 2000s 
they remain well above real GDP growth rates. Unemployment has increased dramatically in 
the late 1970s and in the early 1980s and has not improved since. In the 1990s unemployment 
increased further (though with substantial variation across countries). Finally, real wage 
growth used to grow roughly in line with productivity growth in the 1970s and was reduced in 
the 1980s and thereafter. In the late 1990s and early 2000s real wage growth virtually ceased 
(which is in part due to the strong weight of Germany). Overall wage shares have declined by 
almost 10%-points in the Euro area. 
 
We conclude that the neoliberal mode of regulation has (at least so far) come with a 
disappointing macroeconomic performance. If there is a Post-Fordist regime of accumulation, 
it is a regime of slow accumulation (at least in Europe). The next step is to investigate to what 
extent this regime of accumulation can be regarded as finance dominated. To what extent has 
financialization shaped key macro economic relations? This question will be explored for 
consumption behaviour, investment behaviour, capital flows and government expenditures in 
the following sections. 
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Households: changes in consumption behaviour? 
 
How has financialization affected household behavior? One frequently discussed question is 
to what extent private households hold their wealth in form of financial assets, in particular 
shares. Furthermore Langley (2007) highlights that financialization has also far-reaching 
psychological consequences as individuals have to develop new forms of financial self 
discipline. Given our focus on macroeconomic issues the key question is how private 
consumption expenditures (and conversely savings) has been affected by financialization. As 
private consumption is the largest single component of aggregate demand, the answer to this 
question, while seemingly technical, is an important one. 
 
In the 1990s macroeconomists rediscovered the wealth effect in the consumption function. 
This rediscovery was motivated by the economic experience in the USA, where private 
consumption expenditures became the driving force in GDP growth. The falling saving rates 
were thus explained by the rise in financial assets because of the stock market boom. In the 
late 1990s a 5% marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth was often quoted 
(with some more qualification for European countries; e.g. Boone, Giorno and Richardson 
1998). To the surprise of many economists, the stock market crash in 2000 did not result in 
slowdown in consumption growth. The unabated consumption boom in the USA, was then 
explained by booming house prices. Residential property was thus identified as the key source 
of the wealth effect. Several studies claimed to find substantially higher marginal propensity 
to consume out of property wealth than out of financial assets (Catte, P, Girouard, N, Price R, 
André, C, 2004, Girouard, N, Kennedy M, André, C, 2006, Case, K, Shiller, R, Quigley, J, 
2001). One of the reasons that housing wealth is supposed to drive consumption expenditures 
is that residential property is more frequently accepted as collateral.  
 
While there is substantial evidence for the USA (albeit based on a short period of 
observations!) to back up this story, the evidence on European economies was always much 
thinner. Typically the wealth effects estimated for European economies were much smaller. 
Moreover the US housing market differs from those in continental Europe and reliable data on 
(aggregate) house prices is not readily available. It is thus not clear to what extent the 
mainstream story for the USA also applies to European economies. 
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Booming property prices and a mortgage fuelled consumption boom, however only cover 
parts of how financialization may affect consumption behaviour. More generally speaking, 
financialization has given households more access to credit. Access of credit, of course, is not 
restricted to mortgages, but also includes other forms of consumer credit, credit cards and 
overdraft bank accounts. Consequently household debt is increasing. Unfortunately there is 
little systematic literature on changes marketing policies of banks. It is therefore impossible to 
say to what extent the higher exposure of households is due to their decisions due to improved 
access to credit because of housing wealth and to what extent is it is due to more aggressive 
policies from banks.5
 
Household debt is difficult to measure and international comparisons chronically suffer from 
deficiencies in comparability of data due to different financial institutions and practices in 
different countries. Therefore debt ratios should only be compared with caution. Table 2 uses 
data from Girourard, Kennedy and André (2006), which contains the OECD’s estimates of 
household debt compared to disposable income. European countries display a wide range of 
debt to income ratios, which may in part be due to problems data comparability. However all 
European countries (for which data is available) have experience rising debt ratios since 1995. 
Notably the (unweighted) average of the debt ratios of the European countries is similar to the 
USA.  
 
                                                 
5 The mainstream literature assumes that households are rational. They increase their debt ratios because their 
wealth increased. While this is probably part of the story, it is also conceivable that a substantial part of the 
accumulated debt is due to households irrationally maintaining consumption levels that are unsustainable. As 
wages have stagnated in many countries, but consumption norms as represented in mass media have arguably 
increased, many households could have been driven into debt. Moreover, there is evidence from experimental 
psychology that the means of payment influences consumption decisions: consumers typically buy more when 
using credit cards. This is another indication that debt ratios are in part not due to rational decisions. 
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Table 2 
 
Household debt as percent of disposable income 
 1995 2000 2005 
Germany 97 111 107 
France 66 78 89 
Italy 32 46 59 
United Kingdom 106 118 159 
Denmark 188 236 260 
Finland 64 66 89 
Ireland  81 141 
Netherlands 113 175 246 
Spain 59 83 107 
Sweden 90 107 134 
    
uw. mean EU countries 91 110 139 
United States 93 107 135 
Japan 113 136 132 
    
Note: Data for Denmark, Spain and Japan refer to 2004 rather than 2005. 
Source: Girourard et. al. (2006)  
 
 
OECD data also show that (household) savings rates are falling throughout the OECD 
countries, with the most pronounced fall occurring in the USA. Surprisingly, however, it turns 
out that this is not mirrored in the consumption data as summarized in Table 3. While the 
USA (and Japan) have experienced a substantial and consistent increase of the consumption 
compared to disposable income since the mid 1980, the same is not true in Europe. In most 
countries, notably France and Germany, the changes in the consumption share are in the order 
of magnitude that are within the range of a business cycle. There was a strong increase in 
Greece and a strong decrease in Ireland. The (unweighted) average of the EU15 is 
unambiguous flat with no change in the consumption ratio of economic significance.  
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Table 3  
Private consumption expenditures as percent of disposable income 
 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
Belgium 0.63 0.67 0.63 0.63 
Denmark 0.63 0.65 0.62 0.59 
FR. Germany 0.64 0.66 0.69 0.70 
Greece 0.63 0.70 0.75 0.74 
Spain 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.70 
France 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.66 
Ireland 0.73 0.75 0.68 0.62 
Italy 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 
Luxembourg 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.53 
Netherlands 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.58 
Austria 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.67 
Portugal 0.79 0.75 0.74 0.78 
Finland 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.61 
Sweden 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.56 
United Kingdom 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.72 
     
EU uwa 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.65 
United States 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.80 
Japan 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.71 
     
source: AMECO    
 
While these data suggest that the changes in consumption behaviour are not substantial (other 
than maybe the USA), there are several qualifications. First, European countries, have 
experienced a substantial decline in the wage share. As wage incomes are typically associated 
with higher consumption propensities than profit incomes, this ought to lead to a decrease in 
the consumption share. Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer (2007) find a saving differential of 
around 0.4.6 Given that wage shares have declined by some 10 %-points since 1980, 
consumption shares ought to have declined by some 4% points over this period due to income 
distribution. If so, increased debt could have compensated this decline. 
 
Second, in many countries the pay-as-you-go pension systems are being reformed or have 
been questioned. Typically some version of a capital-based system is envisioned in which 
households have to invest their savings (usually via funds) in the stock market. This should 
lead to an increase in savings. Financialization may thus have contradictory effects on 
consumption: on the one hand it may increase consumption (for a given income level) 
because it improves access to credit; on the other hand it may decrease consumption as a 
higher proportion of income has to be saved (privately) for retirement. 
                                                 
6 This value is in line with comparable studies for other groups of countries (Naastepad and Storm 2005/06, Hein 
and Vogel 2007). 
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 Third, increased mortgages need not go into consumption; instead they may lead to increased 
residential investment. Anecdotal evidence certainly has it that this has happened in Ireland 
and in Spain. We will return to this issue in the next section. 
 
Investment 
 
Financialization brought about many changes that potentially affect business investment (that 
is physical investment by firms): new financial instruments have changed financing patterns, 
shareholder value orientation affected management goals, instability on financial markets 
could increase uncertainty for firms, to name some of them. However it has been hard to pin 
down these effects. In part this is probably due to the fact that effects of financialization are 
difficult to measure, in part this may be a mere reflection of the fact that business investment 
has always been the macroeconomic variable that is hardest to explain for economists. 
 
One of the most important changes in investment behaviour is due to the increased role of 
shareholder in the firm. Rather than a management-labor balance (like in the Fordist era), 
firms are now characterized by a management-shareholder balance. Several contributions 
have discussed the microeconomics of shareholder value orientation (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000, Stockhammer 2004). Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that a shift in 
management behaviour from ‘retain and reinvest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’ has occurred. 
More formally, Stockhammer (2004) shows that an increase in shareholder power will modify 
the desired profit-growth frontier for the firm. His estimations suggest that financialization 
may explain a substantial part of the slowdown in accumulation. However results vary widely 
across countries.  
 
A second change for investment behaviour has been in the economic environment that firms 
face. Volatility on financial markets has increased substantially in the course of financial 
deregulation. As a consequence firms face a higher degree of uncertainty which may make 
physical investment project less attractive. In particular volatility of exchange rates seems to 
have had some effects on manufacturing investment. However, uncertainty is hard to measure 
and estimation results form the existing literature are not conclusive enough to suggest a clear 
order of magnitude of the effect (Carruth et al 2000). 
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Firms have overall not used new financial instruments to extend their investment 
expenditures. In the Anglo Saxon countries the buy back of corporate share has led to an 
overall negative contribution of stock market to the finance position of non-financial 
businesses (Schaberg 1999). Non-financial firms seem to increasingly rely on internal finance 
for investment projects. Overall non-financial businesses seem to move from a net debtor 
position to a neutral or net creditor position. However data on these issues are not readily 
available or comparable. 7
 
Here we contend ourselves to highlighting the changing relation between profits and 
investment. In the major economies (Germany, France and the UK as well as the USA) the 
investment/profit ratio shows a clear declining trend. Some countries like Greece, Spain and 
Luxembourg show an increasing trend. The unweighted average for the EU countries for 
which data is available has declined from 47% to in the 1970s to 40% in the 2000s. 
 
As the measure of operating surplus used here (as well as in the National Accounts) is a broad 
one that consists basically of all non-wage incomes, part of the reason for the declining trend 
in the investment operating surplus ratio is due to a change in the composition of the 
operating surplus. Interest and dividend payments have increased (Duménil and Lévy 2001, 
Crotty 2003). However only for few countries, namely for the USA, is data readily available. 
 
                                                 
7 Duménil and Lévy present data for France and the USA. Stockhammer (2004a, Table 5.5) summarizes data on 
several major economies. However, changes in the System of National Accounts make it impossible to update 
the data. 
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Table 4 
Gross fixed capital formation as percent of operating surplus 
 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
AUSTRIA 59.0% 49.9% 47.5% 44.1% 
BELGIUM     
DENMARK 46.3% 47.0% 45.8% 48.9% 
FINLAND 56.8% 56.7% 41.2% 36.0% 
FRANCE 46.5% 46.1% 41.9% 42.6% 
GERMANY 52.2% 47.6% 41.7% 35.1% 
GREECE 24.4% 24.0% 26.3% 36.3% 
IRELAND 50.2% 44.1% 29.6% 27.5% 
ITALY 41.3% 35.8% 31.4% 33.0% 
LUXEMBOURG 39.1% 48.3% 51.2% 50.2% 
NETHERLANDS 47.5% 38.9% 38.4% 37.7% 
PORTUGAL 36.7% 35.0% 30.8% 33.8% 
SPAIN 46.9% 40.4% 43.6% 47.3% 
SWEDEN 59.3% 52.3% 46.2% 51.1% 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 54.9% 47.8% 43.5% 42.5% 
     
EU uwa 47.2% 43.8% 39.9% 40.4% 
UNITED STATES 45.9% 43.8% 39.5% 39.2% 
JAPAN 58.4% 58.9% 60.9% 55.9% 
 
Source: OECD National Accounts 
 
While the above graph is a striking illustration that higher profits do not automatically lead to 
higher investment, this should not be all that surprising. Keynesians have long maintained that 
investment is about expectations rather than profits. Kalecki pointed out that the causation 
may be inverse: investment causing profits, rather than the other way. Empirically, profits 
play a modest role in determining investment. Ford and Poret (1991) find no evidence that 
profits affect (aggregate) investment and Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer (2007) report 
minor effects for the EU12. 
 
As noted in the previous section, households have taken out substantial amounts of mortgages 
over the past ten years. If this debt is not increasing consumption, one might expect an 
increase in residential investment. As illustrated in Figure 1, however, this is not the case.8 
The ratio residential to (non-residential) business investment is decreasing rather than 
increasing. The household debt boom seems to have fuelled consumption rather than 
investment. Only for Ireland is residential investment growing faster than business 
investment, but this is a clear exception. The unweighted average for the EU countries for 
                                                 
8 Results look very similar if one looks at residential investment compared to disposable income rather than 
business investment.  
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which data is available shows a declining trend, with the ration dropping from 62% (in 1985) 
to 51% (in 1995) and 46% (in 2005). 
 
Figure 1. Residential investment are ratio of (non-residential) business investment 
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Source: AMECO 
 
Overall there is no evidence that financialization has had a positive effects on business 
investment. Rather the evidence is suggestive that the effects were negative due to 
shareholder value orientation and increase uncertainty. Notably, there has been no renewed 
interest in the effect of share prices on business investment (quite in contrast to the research 
on consumption expenditures and share prices). As in the early 1990s (Chirinko 1993, Ford 
and Poret 1992), most empirical economists would probably agree that share prices have little 
if any effect on investment. Nor is there much evidence that (other than maybe in Ireland) 
residential investment has been strongly affected by rising household debt levels.  
 
The foreign sector 
 
In the aggregate expenditure function the foreign sector is represented by net exports. Over 
longer periods net exports will be balanced for most countries and, indeed, for the Euro area 
as a whole (but not within the Euro area) net exports are of a minor magnitude. However, this 
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is the most interesting aspect of financialization in this area comes as the flip side of the 
current account: capital flows. It is important to realize that (abstracting from changes in 
Central Bank reserves) net exports have to equal (net) capital outflows. Inversely, a current 
account deficit corresponds to capital inflows. It is capital flows that have been most affected 
by financialization, or to be more precise, by financial deregulation.  
 
The macroeconomic dangers of volatile capital flows have so far been felt mostly in emerging 
economies. Mexico 1994, Turkey 1994 and 2001, several countries in the course of the South 
East Asian crisis 1997/98, and Argentina 2001 are all examples of such crises related to 
capital flows. Most of them have led to severe recessions (at times with double digit declines 
in real GDP), some of them long-lasting, others more short-lived.9 However, the EMS crisis 
1992/93 also shook developed economies (although the exchange rate devaluation were not as 
strong, nor were the following recessions.) 
 
The reason why changes in the exchange rate have such a devastating effect is that in 
liberalized international markets it usually is profitable to engage in interest arbitrage, that is 
borrow in one currency and lend in another. If, say, interest rates in Turkish Lira are higher 
than those in Euros (with exchange rates expected to be stable), it is tempting to take out a 
euro credit and lend in Turkish lira (e.g. Turkish government bonds). By implication, assets 
and liabilities will then be denominated in different currencies (a related issue is that of the 
maturity of assets). An exchange rate realignment may then have disastrous effects on firms’ 
or banks’ balance sheets.   
 
International exchange rate arrangements seem to be key to understanding the accumulation 
and growth dynamics in the finance-dominated accumulation regime. For Europe, the most 
important institutional change in this area of course was the EMS (which in fact ended with 
the 1992/93 crisis) and European Monetary Unification. The introduction of the Euro was a 
reaction to the EMS crises, where several countries had to devalue their currencies by some 
20% (vis a vis the Deutsch Mark). At first, the Euro appears to have been a success. Not only 
was the new currency accepted by the public, the Euro system does eliminate (nominal) 
exchange rate fluctuations and thereby exchange rate crises. It also substantially decreased 
inflation and (real) interest rates in the formerly soft-currency countries. However, since 
                                                 
9 The fact that some countries recover quickly after a deep recession, does not imply that everything returns to 
pro-crisis. Onaran (2005) argues that financial crises often lead to lasting changes in functional income 
distribution. 
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inflation differentials persist across European countries, there have been creeping changes in 
real exchange rates that have accumulated over the years. As shown in Figure xxx real 
exchange rates have diverged since the introduction of the Euro.10 Germany has devalued by 
more than 20% in real terms vis a vis Portugal, Spain, and Ireland since 1999. This will pose a 
major challenge in the coming years, as the only way how these countries could gain 
competitiveness (in the absence of productivity miracles) is by keeping their inflation well 
below German rates for extended periods. But as German inflation is already close to zero, 
this would imply deflation in these countries, which probably would imply an intensification 
of distributional conflict. 
 
Figure 2. Nominal unit labor costs in the Euro area 
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Europe has reacted to the liberalization of capital flows by a rearrangement of the European 
exchange rate system and introduced a common currency. While this has ended the risk or 
exchange rate crises and brought benefits of low interest rates to countries that previously had 
                                                 
10 Presumably not all countries entered the Euro with the ‘correct’ exchange rate. In particular Deutsch Mark is 
often thought to have entered overvalued. However, if the real exchange rate realignments since 1999 were a 
correction of the initial values, one would expect the real exchange rates to stabilize after a while. As of now 
there is no indication for that. 
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high inflation, trade and cost-related imbalances are building up within the Euro area and 
there not seems to be mechanism for resolving these imbalances. 
 
The state 
 
Downsizing the state was high priority on the to-do-list of neoliberals when they came to 
power in the 1980s and thereafter. Or at least so they claimed. It is remarkable that state 
shares in expenditures and receipts have not been reduced dramatically during the neoliberal 
era. In Figure 3, government total expenditures are depicted as % of GDP (source: OECD 
Economic Outlook database). While the rise of the state sector has clearly been halted after 
1980, the state share has remained at the (historically) level of the late 1970s. 
 
Figure 3. Government expenditures as percent of GDP 
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Note: Government total disbursments, OECD Economic Outlook dataset  
 
Only in three countries (Ireland, UK and the Netherlands) are state shares lower than they 
were in the 1970s. In most countries (and the median) state shares have increased until the 
early 1980s and stagnated thereafter. Given that most countries experienced a neoliberal 
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hegemony of one form of another and the cut back of the state was one of the neoliberals’ 
prime goal, this resilience of big government may be called the neoliberal puzzle.11
 
However, some qualifications are in place. The graph does not imply that neoliberal 
hegemony has not affected the state. It has. State owned enterprises are not counted as state 
sector in the National account and therefore most privatizations will not show up in the data.12 
Furthermore deregulation, not the least in the financial sector, has taken place. As it does not 
affect the economic size of the state it, again, will not show up in the data, even though the 
state influence in the economy may have decreased. What is measured as the size of the state 
sector here is in fact the size of state employment and transfers (and in some countries 
military expenditures). It thus includes the welfare states as well as government bureaucracy. 
Overall it is thus still remarkable how stable state shares have been. 
 
A reason why state shares have remained stable might be that the composition of government 
expenditures has changed (while the overall volume has not). In the context of theorizing 
financialization, the obvious question is, whether the share of government interest payments 
has increased.13 Government (net) interest payments as percent of GDP are shown in Figure 4 
(source: OECD Economic Outlook database). The hike in interest rates in the early 1980s has 
increased interest payments by governments dramatically, increasing to 10% of GDP in some 
countries. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s interest payments climbed to or remained at 
high levels compared to earlier decades.  
 
                                                 
11 Crotty (2003, 2005) also uses the term neoliberal puzzle and defines it as “financial markets demand that 
corporations achieve ever higher profits, while product markets make this result impossible to achieve” Crotty 
(2003, 271). Crotty’s neoliberal puzzle refers to the economic structure, where the notion used in this paper 
refers to economic policy making. 
12 The details may depend on the legal setting. Private firms owned by the state are not counted in the public 
sector. Firms that are institutionally part of the state (as in many cases the postal service) is counted. 
13 Note that Arrighi’s notion of financialization is at times close to what one might call fiscalization. As the 
profitable investment projects get exhausted at the end of long wave, the state comes in and private financiers 
start lending to the state. 
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Figure 4. Government interest payments as percent of GDP 
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Since the mid 1990s, however, interest payments have decreased substantially (in the 
Southern European countries this is to a significant extent due to the reduction in interest rates 
because of EMU). In most countries government interest payments now lie between 0 and 3% 
of GDP. In the EU (unweighted average for the countries and periods where data is available) 
government interest payments increased from 0.7% of GDP in the 1979s to 3.8% (in the 
1980s) and 4.5% (in the 1990s) and have since declined to 2.5% in the 2000s. Within the Euro 
system it is the Mediterranean countries that have experienced the greatest decline in 
government interest payments. While interest payments thus remain a significant part of GDP 
and are much higher than they were in the Fordist era, they are clearly not the main driving 
force behind stable state shares. 
 
Why have recessions not been more severe in the finance-dominated accumulation 
regime? 
 
Let us briefly summarize the findings of this paper. For European countries one does not find 
the strong evidence of a consumption boom (related with a property price bubble) that has 
been reported for the USA. Consumption ratios are stagnant. However given that income 
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distribution has changed at the expense of labor, which should have decreased consumption 
ratios, it is plausible that debt-driven consumption has also fuelled demand in Europe. There 
is little evidence however, that this debt, much of which is mortgage has indeed caused a 
substantial increase in residential investment. The latter is falling as a share of overall 
investment. And investment as such has not been a driving force of demand. In particular 
rising profits have not translated into rising investment. Liberalization of capital flows has 
lead to volatile exchange rates, which have not translated into a severe crisis in Europe as they 
did in South East Asia, Latin America or Turkey, though the 1992/93 EMS crises certainly 
qualifies as serious. However, macroeconomic developments have also been strongly 
influenced by exchange rate arrangements through the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Overall the effects of financialization thus give rise to a finance-dominated 
accumulation regime that is one of slow and volatile accumulation. 
 
While growth has been moderate in advanced capitalist countries (ACC) (with a high growth 
episode in the USA in the 1990s), recessions have been somewhat harsher than in the Fordist 
era, but still mild by historical standards. Given our discussion so far, one might wonder why 
recessions have not been more severe so far. We might call this the Minskyian puzzle, as 
Hyman Minsky asserted that unregulated financial markets are prone to endogenous 
instability.  
 
There are four potential answers to this puzzle. The first is, that recession indeed have been 
harsh – in emerging economies, if not yet in ACCs. In particular the Latin American and the 
Turkish experience is much in line with the Minskyan argument (if one extends Minsky to 
include foreign exchange markets). 
 
The second answer is, indeed, Minsky’s answer: big government. State shares are 
substantially higher than at the time of Great Depression and, as pointed out, the neoliberal 
era has not reduced them substantially. Automatic stabilizers are thus in place and 
government consumption forms a sizable part of the value added. Moreover, Central Banks in 
ACCs (in particular the Fed) have been pro-active in reacting to dangers of financial crisis. 
The resilience of a sizable government sector and (by historical standards) a functional 
welfare state may be the reason, why financial crises have so far not had a devastating effect 
on (advanced) economies. 
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The third answer is that recessions have not been severe yet, but the bad recession is just 
around the corner. Several mainstream economic institutions have been worried recently 
about the mounting imbalances (BIS 2005 annual report, IMF World Economic Outlook 
2006). On the heterodox side Crotty (2007) has made a compelling argument (with a focus on 
US institutions) that the financial sector holds much more risk than is commonly realized. 
 
Finally, the ‘crisis ahead’ argument runs the danger of misinterpreting what financialization 
meant for the macroeconomic pattern for ACCs. Financial deregulation has come with wide 
swings in the prices of financial assets (such as share prices and foreign exchange rates) that 
clearly deviate from what economists consider the underlying fundamentals. These deviations 
are economically inefficient and harmful. But rather than the abrupt and devastating 
adjustments, what we seem to be experiencing at least with respect to foreign exchange 
markets, is a slow and extended adjustment process. Rather than the USA in 1930s and 
Argentine in the late 1990s, the type of crisis associated with the finance-dominated 
accumulation regime may be Japan’s painful period of stagnation and deflation. The high 
inflation countries in the EMU may soon experience similar phenomena. 
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Appendix 
 
Residential investment as percent of business investment 
 1985 1995 2005 1985-95 1995-2005 
Austria 50% 52% 27% 3% -25% 
Belgium 36% 43% 36% 7% -7% 
Germany  66% 45%  -21% 
Denmark 53% 34% 39% -19% 5% 
Spain 55% 42% 41% -13% 0% 
Finland 52% 41% 47% -12% 6% 
France 60% 48% 44% -13% -4% 
United Kingdom 79% 58% 49% -21% -8% 
Greece 74% 47% 26% -26% -21% 
Ireland 105% 103% 118% -2% 15% 
Netherlands 59% 58% 57% 0% -2% 
Sweden 54% 17% 22% -38% 5% 
      
EU countries 62% 51% 46% -11% -5% 
United States 54% 46% 50% -8% 3% 
Japan 36% 35% 23% 0% -13% 
 
Government expenditures as percent of GDP 
 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-06 
     
Austria 44.3 52.2 54.0 50.5 
Belgium  55.5 52.2 49.6 
Germany   48.0 47.0 
Denmark 45.3 56.0 57.9 53.9 
Spain 26.3 39.3 43.5 38.5 
Finland 36.2 44.5 57.8 49.2 
France 41.6 49.4 52.8 52.9 
United 
Kingdom 45.4 46.3 43.4 42.6 
Greece 29.0 41.3 48.9 48.8 
Ireland 45.8 52.9 40.8 33.5 
Italy 37.1 48.2 52.5 47.9 
Luxembourg   39.7 41.3 
Netherlands 47.7 55.8 50.2 45.9 
Portugal 31.2 37.5 43.3 45.6 
Sweden 50.1 63.4 65.2 56.9 
     
EU uwa 40.0 49.4 50.0 46.9 
United States 32.7 36.2 36.6 36.0 
Japan 26.0 32.4 35.1 38.0 
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Government (net) interest payments as % of GDP 
 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
Austria 0.66 2.14 3.01 2.41 
Belgium  9.83 8.88 5.11 
Germany   2.64 2.48 
Denmark 0.05 4.72 3.95 2.03 
Spain -0.11 1.48 4.03 2.15 
Finland -0.57 -1.10 0.18 0.27 
France 0.28 1.53 2.72 2.51 
United Kingdom 2.56 3.48 2.75 1.93 
Greece 0.97 4.40 10.32 5.45 
Ireland 1.99 5.96 3.96 0.15 
Italy 1.96 6.77 9.73 4.81 
Luxembourg     
Netherlands  3.67 4.08 2.13 
Portugal 1.94 5.54 5.93 2.89 
Sweden -1.62 0.40 0.50 0.17 
     
United States 1.50 2.70 3.33 2.11 
Japan 0.08 1.81 1.28 1.40 
EU uwa 0.74 3.76 4.48 2.46 
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